



**University of
Zurich**^{UZH}

**Zurich Open Repository and
Archive**

University of Zurich
University Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch

Year: 2013

Who governs and how: governance arrangements, decision making and implementation processes of spatial development policies in Swiss suburban municipalities

Devecchi, Lineo Umberto

Abstract: Swiss metropolitan areas and their municipalities face challenges as e.g. the increasing number and the bigger mobility of their inhabitants, economic structural changes or the on-going urban sprawl in suburban regions. Whereas the core cities of such areas have been studied intensively, there exist little theoretical and empirical knowledge about the political decision-making and implementation processes in smaller suburban municipalities concerning the important relations between the public and the private for planning and generating the built environment. I thus investigate the following research questions: What different kinds of governance arrangements exist in suburban municipalities and which factors let these types emerge? How then can public and private stakeholders influence the decision making and implementation processes of local development policies within these arrangements? Theoretically I draw on literature about local governance-types, recent work on small democracies and on urban regime theory. The case selection bases on two criteria theoretically relevant for the emergence of different governance arrangements: The size and the economic situation of a municipality. The results of the qualitative analysis show that different governance arrangements exist in the four suburban municipalities related to the collaboration between relevant actors, the decision and implementation rationales and the political resources used. Bigger municipalities tend to be governed by urban regime-like forms of cooperation between public and private actors. Governance arrangements in smaller municipalities are however characterised by looser forms of cooperation. Where public actors are able to dominate the local governance arrangements in economically positive surroundings, they are more dependent on private actors in shrinking municipalities, but only when it comes to pivotal building projects because the mayors interpret the role of the state more in an active, than only in an intervening way.

Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: <https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-87995>
Conference or Workshop Item

Originally published at:

Devecchi, Lineo Umberto (2013). Who governs and how: governance arrangements, decision making and implementation processes of spatial development policies in Swiss suburban municipalities. In: International Conference on Public Policy, Grenoble, 26 June 2013 - 28 June 2013, ICPP.

Who governs and how: governance arrangements, decision making and implementation processes of spatial development policies in Swiss suburban municipalities

Lineo Umberto Devecchi¹, paper prepared for the International Conference on Public Policy, Grenoble, June 2013

Workshop 47: Who governs in public governance? The politics of public and private in local services

Work in progress, do not cite or quote.

Abstract | Swiss metropolitan areas and their municipalities face challenges as e.g. the increasing number and the bigger mobility of their inhabitants, economic structural changes or the on-going urban sprawl in suburban regions. Whereas the core cities of such areas have been studied intensively, there exist little theoretical and empirical knowledge about the political decision-making and implementation processes in smaller suburban municipalities concerning the important relations between the public and the private for planning and generating the built environment.

I thus investigate the following research questions: What different kinds of governance arrangements exist in suburban municipalities and which factors let these types emerge? How then can public and private stakeholders influence the decision making and implementation processes of local development policies within these arrangements? Theoretically I draw on literature about local governance-types, recent work on small democracies and on urban regime theory. The case selection bases on two criteria theoretically relevant for the emergence of different governance arrangements: The size and the economic situation of a municipality.

The results of the qualitative analysis show that different governance arrangements exist in the four suburban municipalities related to the collaboration between relevant actors, the decision and implementation rationales and the political resources used. Bigger municipalities tend to be governed by urban regime-like forms of cooperation between public and private actors. Governance arrangements in smaller municipalities are however characterised by looser forms of cooperation. Where public actors are able to dominate the local governance arrangements in economically positive surroundings, they are more dependent on private actors in shrinking municipalities, but only when it comes to pivotal building projects because the mayors interpret the role of the state more in an active, than only in an intervening way.

1 INTRODUCTION

Switzerland is the longer the more a country of functionally integrated agglomerations and metropolitan areas. Swiss metropolitan areas and their municipalities face challenges as e.g. the increasing number and the bigger mobility of their inhabitants in terms of commuting and housing, economic structural changes or the on-going urban sprawl in suburban municipalities. All these factors impose a heavy burden on the politicians, the bureaucrats, the planners and the architects working in the field of local spatial planning and development. This situation is especially challenging for smaller municipalities, because their administrative capacities and the local political systems are supposed to be weaker, hence the capacity to handle topics as housing, spatial planning, urban design and local economic development smaller than the ones of the core cities.

The political processes of urban development and spatial planning in core cities of such (Swiss) metropolitan areas have been studied intensively². The same is true for

¹ Lineo Devecchi, PhD candidate, University of Zurich, Department of Political Science, Chair of Research on Democracy and Public Governance, Affolternstrasse 56, CH-8050 Zurich, Switzerland, devecchi@ipz.uzh.ch, 0041 44 634 58 43.

the different politico-institutional solutions concerning the governance of functionally integrated urban areas³. There exist however little theoretical and empirical knowledge about the political decision-making and implementation processes in smaller suburban municipalities concerning the important relations between the public and the private for planning and generating the built environment.

I thus investigate the following research questions: What different kinds of governance arrangements exist in suburban municipalities and which factors let these types emerge? How then can public and private stakeholders influence the decision-making and implementation processes of local development policies within these arrangements?

This focus should make it possible to tie this paper up at Dahl's legendary question of 'who governs?', linking it to smaller municipalities (of metropolitan areas). It is in my view very relevant too to know how such municipalities are governed and by whom. Different governance arrangements feature – as we will see later – significantly differing power structures and forms of cooperation between locally important public and private actors. These differences result generally in a variance of local strategies for spatial planning, housing and development and more concretely in different outcomes concerning the public space, the type of housing and local business provided; in short: the built environment in which the longer the more a majority of Swiss inhabitants is living in.

This article starts with a theoretical overview on the state of the art of the urban governance literature and with a newly derived theoretical model concerning the emergence of different local governance arrangements. This theoretical chapter is followed by a short methodological overview. Chapter four then reflects the results of four case studies, showing the different local governance arrangements and the possibilities of different stakeholders to influence the decisions for spatial planning and local development policies. It however also uncovers the shortcoming of the proposed model. The results are then discussed in chapter five followed by concluding remarks and some thoughts about possible further research.

2 LOCAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS AND HYPOTHESES

Dahl's question of 'who governs?' has in urban contexts and when focusing on urban development and spatial planning been investigated mostly with the help of different strands of urban governance thinking. Until now mostly big cities as Atlanta, New Haven, New York, Birmingham, Zurich or London have been under scrutiny though. This chapter focuses thus on the state of the art of the urban governance literature and sorts out its most important propositions with the aim at adapting them to a theoretical model with which also smaller (suburban) municipalities can be studied comprehensively.

² See for example Hunter (1953), Dahl (1961), Stone (1989), Knox/Taylor (1993), Cattacin (1994), Hitz et al. (1995), Rüegg (1996), Kleger (1996), Kühne (1997), Sassen (2001), Eberle (2003), Schmid (2006), van der Heiden (2010) or Devecchi (2012).

³ The metropolitan governance-debate: See for example Lefèvre (1998), Norris (2001), Kübler (2003), Brenner (2004), Savitch/Vogel (2009), Kübler/Schwab (2007), Plüss/Kübler (2010) or Koch (2011)

2.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO URBAN GOVERNANCE AND ITS USE FOR SUBURBAN MUNICIPALITIES

Power and decision making processes have been an important research agenda for urban scholars during the last half century. The long discussion was launched by the community power debate, in which elitist and pluralist explanations for the distribution of power were widely deliberated (see Hunter 1953; Mills 1956 [2000]; Dahl 1961). After a decade in which structural approaches with a focus on external (capitalist) factors on city's power structure began to be more present (Castells 1972; Lefebvre 1974 [1991]), the first urban governance concepts arose during the 1980ies (Fainstein and Fainstein 1983; Logan and Molotch 1987; Elkin 1987; Stone 1989). These works approached Dahl's question of 'who governs?' again from a local perspective, (re)emphasising local actors and their 'capacity to govern' a city. The work on urban regimes began to be the focal point of American urban scholars. This concept, where urban regimes are defined as longstanding formal or informal coalition between political and private actors, sharing a common policy agenda and thus bridging the necessary resources for a city's (economic) development (Stone 1993; Mossberger and Stoker 2001), has been used widely and has brought many insights in regard to the collaboration between public and private interests and their jointly pursued policy goals (see e.g. Orr and Stoker 1994; Ferman 1996; Kühne 1997; John and Cole 1998; Dowding et al. 1999; Hamilton 2002; Devecchi 2012). Urban regime scholars however have also been criticised, mostly by authors writing on (comparative) urban governance (Kantor et al. 1997; Imbroscio 1998, 2003; Davies 2002, 2003). The central critique concerns the ethnocentric focus on mainly American cities and the fact that typically single case studies have been conducted. Both factors limit the development of new theoretical propositions, valid for more than only American cities (Pierre 2005). It is hence widely suggested to implement urban regime theory in a broader governance framework what is elaborated later on in this chapter.

When talking about urban governance, it is clearly important to define the way in which I will use the term *governance* throughout my argumentation. Many different meanings have been used for this term until today, whereby commonly three different definitions are mentioned (Pierre 2005; Koch 2011). *Firstly* governance can be understood *as a theory*, which offers an analytical framework with a set of criteria that define the relevant objects to study and their relations. As an observer one has to focus on the processes occurring between the different actors, be they public or private, when pursuing collectively defined objectives. Governance as a theory hence allows to look beyond institutional variables and thus brings the interaction – formal or informal – between different actors to the forefront (Stoker 1998; Pierre and Peters 2000). *Secondly* governance can be observed *as a normatively driven organisational model* based on private organisations competitively providing local services instead of local government institutions (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001). *Finally* one can focus on governance understanding it *as an empirical objective of study*, whose emergence and forms can be analysed either with governance as a theory or by other theoretical concepts, as e.g. with a neo-institutional model (Pierre 2005). Here the emphasis lies on the analysis of different political, social or economic forces which are responsible for the production and the sustainability of different modes or arrangements of governance, whereby governance is understood as "the pursuit of collective goals through an inclusive strategy of resource mobilization" (Pierre 2005: 449). Governance in that sense are all forms of exchange between political (*the government*) and private actors to

pursue collective goals. According to Pierre (1998) it would be misleading to see the new paradigm for the implementation of market instead of public organisations for providing public services as the starting point of governance. Governance is thus as old as government itself, because “all forms of government are embedded in – and shaped by – a particular model of state-society interaction” (Pierre 1998: 4).

It seems quite obvious that this last definition provides the best solution for the purpose of this article, in which a comparative analysis of different forms of governance arrangements is pursued. Not all forms of exchange between public and private actors should however be defined as governance, because “then soon everything becomes governance” (Pierre 1999: 376). To overcome such an oversimplification, Pierre (1998, 1999, 2005) and others (see e.g. Kantor et al. 1997; Sellers 2002a; DiGaetano and Strom 2003) suggest to introduce and then to analyse specific variables, which help to focus on relevant processes and factors that are assumed for being responsible for the emergence of different (local) governance arrangements.

This conceptualisation has led to a line-up of various theoretical, ideal-typical models, types or arrangements of local and urban governance. Stone (2005), Stoker and Mossberger (1994) and others write on the already mentioned urban regimes, coming up with different regime types, mostly distinguishable by their policy agenda⁴. They mention the relation between public and private actors as the most important variable for the establishment of a longstanding cooperation. Kantor et al. (1997) define eight regime types⁵ according to different bargaining situations between public and private actors, which are structured by intergovernmental relations to higher state levels, the market position of a city and the possibilities for democratic participation of the inhabitants. Pierre (1999) defines four models of urban governance⁶, which are shaped mainly by local factors, as “the composition of key participants, the overarching objectives that characterize the governance, the main instruments employed to attain these objectives, and the most common outcomes of the different models” (Pierre 1999: 377). DiGaetano and Lawless (1999) focus on the relations between the state and the society, at the local governing logic and the key decision makers. These factors then bring up four different urban governing structures which can be observed by their policy agenda⁷. According to Sellers (2002a, 2002b, 2005) there are mainly three impact factors forming different governance settings – or regimes⁸ – in urban areas which are the trans-local markets and their actors, the political influences from higher institutional tiers (as federalist vs. centralist state organisation or different tax laws) and internal components of the urban political economy (as e.g. the social structures of the local actors, the natural vs. the built environment, the existing (public) infrastructure). DiGaetano and Strom (2003) finally try to integrate these different explanations for the rise of urban and local governance arrangements or regimes. They formulate a model of urban governance that consists of three different levels of governance, a structural one (urban/local political economy, different intergovernmental systems), a cultural one

⁴ As e.g. maintenance, development, middle-class progressive or lower-class opportunity expansion regimes (Stone 1993).

⁵ Namely dirigist regimes (as planner or distributor regimes), dependent privat regimes (as vendor or radical), dependent public regimes (as grantsman or clientelist) and mercantile regimes (as commercial or free enterprise) (Kantor et al. 1997).

⁶ Namely the managerial, the corporatist, the progrowth and the welfare state model of urban governance (Pierre 1999).

⁷ Namely a clientelist, a corporatist, a managerial and a pluralist governing structure.

⁸ Sellers (2002a: 370) names different regime types as e.g. comprehensive regimes, social-ecological regimes, upscaling regimes or local fordist regimes. His focus lies mainly on the governance of metropolitan areas, and not on their core cities alone.(2001

(based on values and norms of different political cultures) and an agency level (how and what local actors do according to the political culture and the structural factors). The authors derive different hypotheses for all these levels and possibilities of urban governance.

This overview shows that there is mutual consent over the fact of different kinds of forces shaping the form, the type or the arrangement of governance in urban areas and core cities. The authors however do not agree when it comes to the exact functions of these variables, what could also be the result of different understandings of governance. In short, some authors define *external* influences (as e.g. institutional or economic factors), having an impact on the form of local governance whereby others define *internal* objects, actor relations or specific (institutional) processes to look at more closely – with the goal to distinguish different forms of governance from each other. Further they do not clearly agree on a common understanding regarding the most important external variables. Finally there is a clear focus either on the governance of metropolitan areas or on their core cities. Hence governance arrangements of smaller (suburban) municipalities are not at all key aspect of this theoretical and empirical body of literature.

At this point this paper joins in. I want to make use of these two levels of important variables – internal and external – to investigate suburban municipalities and their local governance arrangements. On the one hand I will investigate on external factors influencing the shape of the governance arrangement. On the other hand I use the internal/local variables to grab and describe the different forms of local governance analytically. Local governance arrangements are defined according to my understanding of governance as the form of collaboration between local key actors (public and private) in the policy field of spatial planning and local development (what makes it possible to subsume all aforementioned types of governance, be they urban regimes, governance models, urban governance structures etc. as possible local governance arrangements). To identify the different forms of collaboration I focus – according to the general governance literature – on the most important policy instruments used and on the policy agenda formulated by local actors. The focus on policy instruments is useful, because every choice of a certain policy instruments can be seen as the result of a specific relationship between a government and the public (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007), hence of one type of governance arrangement.

But which of the proposed external variables supposed to be important for the shape and the functioning of governance arrangements are relevant for suburban municipalities also? To answer this question the differences between suburban municipalities have to be exposed. Suburban municipalities are commonly defined over their functions in a metropolitan area, which mainly is being a sleeping village for commuters working in the core cities business districts (Oliver 2001; Kübler 2006; ARE 2009). But the suburban reality is in itself of course a bit more complex: Suburban municipalities can also be industrially important places, they can be the home of big office companies, they can be characterised as agrarian places and their population size or the features of their built environment can vary quite a lot. Sometimes they are even characterised by all these aspects combined in a complex web of spatial, functional and social relations (Sieverts 1997). Further, suburbia is the longer the more a space of economic, social and political segregation, because of economic structural changes, the increased mobility of its inhabitants and in Switzerland also because of the local tax competition between municipalities (Oliver 2001; Kübler and Scheuss 2005; Schmidheiny 2006). In a nutshell, suburban municipalities can thus differ in their

population size, their economic and social composition and their land use patterns (Oliver 2001)⁹.

I argue here that the municipalities' economic situation and their size are the most important factors to influence local governance arrangements and influence the relations between public and private in the implementation processes, the used policy instruments and the formulated policy agenda in the policy field of spatial planning and economic development (see Table 1). These two factors and their possible impact are thus looked at more closely in the next chapters. Other mentioned factors are less important for the Swiss (spatial planning) context; especially the relationship to higher institutional levels and the question of decentralisation. Concerning spatial planning and development, Swiss municipalities have in general similar (and quite big) local autonomy and policy instruments to govern and regulate their spatial planning, their economic development policies and the thus built environment.

Table 1: A first draft for my theoretical model to explain different governance arrangements and the key concepts to grab and describe them analytically



2.2 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIC PRESSURE

According to Davies (2002) or DiGaetano and Strom (2003) the structural context is the most important source for different local settings in the area of urban governance. For them the structural context is equal to a changing economic situation and to a new understanding of statehood in modern capitalist societies facing globalisation processes, which means e.g. decentralisation of duties and power to lower state levels. As I argued before, I will only take the economic influences into account, because the differences in decentralisation and local autonomy are negligible between Swiss municipalities in the field of spatial planning and development. The spatially uneven development of the globalised economy produces however different situations for cities and their surrounding municipalities (DiGaetano and Strom 2003; Brenner 1999, 2000; Brenner and Theodore 2004). In cities which are able to attract new-economy investments (as companies of the tertiary sector) the local governance arrangement look different than in cities with old-economy structures (as industry plants). DiGaetano and Strom (2003) argue that new forms of cooperative governance emerge in cities where investments in new economies are growing. Private firms and interests gain influence in local decision making processes since the position of public organisations as workers associations weakens. This leads to public private partnerships or more corporatist forms of urban governance.

Until today these theoretical arguments have been formulated and tested for either the governance of metropolitan areas or for their core cities. I however argue that the uneven economic development has different – and sometimes even contradicting – implications, when we analyse suburban municipalities. At first we have to consider that

⁹ For Oliver (2001), suburban municipalities differ also because of their racial composition and their political institutions. The first is not relevant for municipalities in Switzerland and the second is discussed later in this paper in relation to the municipalities' size.

suburban municipalities often do not have the same economic position in a metropolitan area than the core cities. Simply spoken, a suburban municipality is most often highly dependent on the economic situation of the metropolitan area (and its core city) that it belongs to. They thus find themselves in a favourable or a non-favourable economic surrounding, which is produced mainly not by themselves, but by the metropolitan area as a whole and the economic competitiveness of its core city. In economically successful metropolis' suburban municipalities are under development pressure. They have to provide new housing and working spaces and are often the desired place to live for many people commuting to the core city (Brenner 2004). In economically negative surroundings they are however spaces of flight, what can result in a vicious circle followed by a shrinking population, less tax income and thus less investment attractiveness (Bernt 2009).

There is another factor which differs between metropolitan areas or their core cities on the one hand and suburban municipalities on the other: The competition between these different levels of statehood, fostered by the globalising economy and the increasing mobility of capital (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; DiGaetano and Strom 2003; Brenner and Theodore 2004). Whereas metropolitan areas and core cities compete with other metropolitan areas and their core cities, suburban municipalities compete with their neighbouring communes in the same urban area and *ergo* with the same economic conditions¹⁰. Especially in countries with high local tax autonomies as Switzerland, such a competition can be assumed as highly developed (Schmidheiny 2006; Schaltegger et al. 2011).

For Kantor et al. (1997) and the authors of public choice the investment attractiveness of a municipality is an important factor in the bargaining position of the local state against private interests. I assume that the economic surrounding (positive or negative) and the Swiss tax system both shape this bargaining position and hence the local governance arrangement in suburban municipalities. Firstly it can be argued that the local tax competition makes it necessary for municipalities to be able to attract private capital. Private capital raises the local tax income used for the delivery of public services and thus makes it possible to decrease the tax level. Like this, municipalities gain again advantages over other communes in attracting more private capital. Municipalities under development pressure are hence in a better bargaining position to private interests than local governments in shrinking municipalities. To pursue collective goals with the help of private capital means in the field of spatial development that private investors are forced by the local government to follow at least some public goals (as e.g. planning public or green spaces, promote social housing) when developing new building projects. A positive economic situation means also that there exists a competition between private investors, what could be usefully capitalized by the local state in favour of its policy goals. The importance of public development policies that normally attract private investors however diminishes in economically shrinking regions (Bernt 2009). This fact leads to a poorer situation of the local state when confronted with private investors. Adapted to local spatial planning, this situation means that less private actors are ready to invest e.g. in housing or other building projects, because the demand for living or business space declines while the tax level often rises. The local government is thus the longer the more dependent on *those* private actors that still are able and willing to invest. Consequently it can be assumed that private interests gain importance in such situations, because the local state is not willing to scare the remaining investors away.

¹⁰ See here also the public choice literature on metropolitan governance: Tiebout (1956), Ostrom et al. (1961), Ostrom and Ostrom (1971), Norris (2001), Frey and Eichenberger (2001).

This theoretical argumentation leads to the following first thesis to be tested in Swiss suburban municipalities:

Thesis 1: In situations characterised by an economic development pressure, the governance arrangement of a suburban municipality is dominated by the local government and not by private actors, whereas in shrinking municipalities the private actors dominate.

2.3 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SIZE OF A MUNICIPALITY

The question about the impact of the size of a political unit on political cooperation, on voter turnouts, on the efficiency of political processes or more general on political decision making processes has been a widely discussed one – with no clear answers yet (see e.g. Dahl and Tufte 1973; Newton 1982; Oliver 2000; Rose 2002; Swanievicz 2002). Current work on smaller and especially on suburban municipalities however discusses new and more detailed aspects of a municipality's size in relation to its government or governance logics (Oliver 2001, 2012).

What exactly differs between municipalities according to their size? Size alone is not a useful variable for explaining local governance arrangements; it has to be deconstructed in its core elements. I argue that two dimensions are important in this respect. *Firstly* municipalities differ in their political actions and their governing logic and hence in their governance arrangements since their size influences the form of *local institutions*, the *scope* of politically discussed topics and their *political bias* in which local resources are spent in a way profitable for the public (Oliver 2012). According to Oliver (2012) the political scope is narrower in smaller municipalities. This means that bigger municipalities tend to focus on more policy fields what results from the broader pool of interests formulated by their inhabitants and interest groups (see also Ladner 1994). Hence the smaller a suburban municipality, the more its politicians concentrate the public spending for the protection of local land prices, a low tax level and local school policies. These three topics are the most useful in attracting good tax payers (Oliver 2012). Because smaller municipalities have narrower scopes and biases and thus smaller amounts of money have to be paid for public goals, a discussion over public spending is less important. This fact brings Oliver (2012) to the conclusion that longstanding cooperations in the form of Stone's urban regimes are less likely to be found in small municipalities. Such regimes gain importance in bigger municipalities where conflicts over the priority of public goals emerge and the resources to pursue them are more fragmented. Longstanding cooperations offer the possibility of side-payments and a certain chance of getting back the invested money – sometimes also indirectly – because of mutual trust or growing dependencies between public and private actors or interests (Stone 1993; Mossberger and Stoker 2001). Longstanding cooperations with similar interests and thus more coherent policy agendas can be more effective, but functioning regimes with different internal interest seem to have the higher stability during conflict situation. Or, as Stone (1993: 8) puts it: "Fixed preferences give rise to unstable coalitions and fluid preferences to stable one."

Secondly the professionalization of local political and administrative staff can influence local governance arrangements. Keating (1993: 389) states that "within cities the capacity of elected officials to manage change depends also on their bureaucratic and technical resources". This conclusion is even more relevant when we consider that suburban municipalities are usually a lot smaller than most cities. Nevertheless they face complicated spatial and political situations as mentioned earlier. What does that mean for local governance arrangements? It is quite easy to observe that the

professionalization also depends on the size of a municipality. A local state of a big suburban municipality is according to Keating's argument better enabled to build up technical knowledge and thus has the ability to meet private interests at eye level. Consequently bigger municipalities are able to build up longstanding coordinations with private actors more easily than small ones. Higher technical and personal resources within the municipal administration (as e.g. city planners, city architects or spatial planners) also help to guarantee a comprehensive local strategy and thus the feasibility of public and private goals. Such a strategy tends to be more elaborate and suitable for the specific spatial situation of a municipality and can hence also be the basis for a good cooperation with private investors, which often possess big technical resources themselves (Stone 2005). The same argumentation goes for the members of the local political executive. In smaller municipalities executives are more often institutionalised as laymen councils, whereas bigger municipalities tend to e.g. install full-time mayors. It can be assumed that these mayors are capable of influencing local governance arrangements in a cooperative way, because they are able to be present all the time and are thus a more reliable political contact person for private actors.

In sum the following thesis can be derived from the argumentation about the municipalities' size:

Thesis 2: Local governance arrangements in the form of longstanding and close cooperations/coalitions between local government and private actors (urban regimes) can be found in big suburban municipalities and in municipalities with professionalised administrative and executive staff, whereas they do not exist in small municipalities.

A good collaboration between public and private is however important in spatial planning and economic development: Without at least some help from either the public or the private side, most of the actually relevant economic development goals in suburban municipalities – be they private or public goals or economically positive or negative situations – can probably not be reached or implemented if one side pursues them unilateral.

2.4 A MODEL FOR THE SHAPE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

If these two dimensions – the economic situation of a municipality and its size – and the theoretically derived theses are combined, the following model to explain the shape of local governance arrangements can be claimed. According to this I distinguish four different forms of local governance arrangements that differ on two dimensions: The degree of the domination of the local governance through either the local government or the most important private actors and interests, and the forms of collaboration between the local government and the private actors, be they longstanding coalitions or not.

Table 2: A model for the shape of local governance arrangements

		Size of a municipality		
		small	big	
		Forms of collaboration between the local government and private actors		
Economic situation of a municipality	Development Pressure	domination by the local government	domination by the local government	governance dominated by the local government
		no coalitions (HEDINGEN)	coalitions/regimes (USTER)	
	Shrinking Pressure	domination by private actors	domination by private actors	governance dominated by the private actors
		no coalitions (ST. MARGRETHEN)	coalitions/regimes (ARBON)	
		governance with no longstanding coalitions	governance in longstanding coalitions	shape of local governance arrangement

3 FOUR MUNICIPALITIES, 20 INTERVIEWS: A VERY SHORT METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

The case selection of the four municipalities under scrutiny here follows the logic of purposive sampling (Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2007). It is based on the two mentioned criteria that are relevant for the emergence and shape of different governance arrangements: *Firstly* I choose municipalities with different economic situations. It is quite easy to find suburban municipalities under development pressure in Switzerland. Almost all metropolitan or agglomeration areas have increased economically during the last two decades. To look at municipalities under specific economic pressure, our research project¹¹ focuses on municipalities that have recently been connected to new transport infrastructure projects (as new or faster rapid train systems or new motorway connections). Such external events (we call them “urban ruptures”) are supposed to induce even more development pressure. To find shrinking municipalities in Switzerland is however less easy – but they exist. They can mostly be found at the edge of the five big metropolitan areas (with the core cities ZURICH, BASEL, GENEVA-LAUSANNE, BERN or LUGANO), or in agglomeration areas not connected with commuters to these mentioned areas. To select shrinking municipalities easier we focus additionally on places that have faced an immense economic decline, induced by the economic collapse

¹¹ Project title: Urban ruptures/local interventions: Perspectives on suburban planning. Financed by the Swiss national science foundation (SNSF), settled at the Universities of Zurich and Fribourg (political science and urban geography) and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (sociology of architecture), more information on <http://www.nfp65.ch/E/projects/Pages/default.aspx>. In total ten municipalities are selected, whereby four of them are presented in this paper.

of locally important industry factories. Regions with shrinking pressure can be found in the eastern part of Switzerland close to the boarder to Germany and Austria; regions with development pressure in the metropolitan area of ZURICH. In these areas the municipalities have been selected according to their population size. For each economic situation a small and a big commune will thus be analysed. Table 3 gives an overview.

Table 3: Selected municipalities and selection criteria

Municipality	Economic situation	Size (inhabitants)
USTER	Development pressure	Big (ca. 30'000)
HEDINGEN	Development pressure	Small (ca 3'000)
ARBON	Shrinking pressure	Big (ca 15'000)
ST. MARGRETHEN	Shrinking pressure	Small (ca. 5'500)

The data to analyse these four municipalities' governance arrangements were collected with semi-structured interviews (Kvale 2007; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). I interviewed members of the local political executive (as mayors and political heads of the planning/building departments), members of the municipalities' administrations (as administrative heads, spatial planners and city planners) and private actors (as investors or architects), in total 20 persons. The following empirical descriptions and analyses have been conducted with a qualitative thematic analysis based on the theoretically based propositions and theses mentioned before (Gibbs 2007).

4 WHO GOVERNS AND HOW: DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN SWISS SUBURBAN MUNICIPALITIES

In this chapter I will show empirical results from the four municipalities under scrutiny, starting with the two municipalities under development pressure, followed by the two others facing economic decline. All case studies are presented in the same way: Firstly I shortly outline the economic situations that shape the local governance arrangements as theoretically proposed. Secondly I describe the shape of the local governance arrangements with a focus on the most important public and private actors, the most important local policy goals and the policy instruments usually chosen to pursue the agenda. I will then look closer at my two derived theses, *i.e.* on the one hand at the relationships between the most important actors, contrasting the theoretical conditions for urban regimes with the empirical reality in the four municipalities. On the other hand I finally check for the local actors dominating the municipalities' governance arrangement, be they urban regimes or other kinds of governance relations.

4.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH: HEDINGEN AND USTER

HEDINGEN and USTER are both municipalities of the suburban belt of Switzerland's biggest city, ZURICH. They are thus part of the Swiss economic powerhouse, the metropolitan area of ZURICH. Additionally to this positive economic surrounding, the two municipalities are connected very well to the core city through fast train connections (around 15-20 minutes to ZURICH). Both municipalities have been connected even better to ZURICH during the last ten years because the train frequencies have been further increased. HEDINGEN has been additionally connected to the national motorway network a couple of years ago, nowadays allowing much faster rides to the central city. These excellent transport infrastructures have increased the development pressure relating to

new housing projects, new or better shopping possibilities and densification processes in the town centres, mostly for people not willing to live in the core city anymore, however commuting there every working day.

I will start with the description of the smallest municipality in the sample, HEDINGEN. The most important actors concerning the municipal spatial planning and development policies are the local government¹² (especially the mayor, who also holds the department of spatial planning) and the municipal administrative staff, namely its head and the person responsible for building licences¹³. Only a few private actors are mentioned to be important, mostly land owners who developed smaller and one bigger building projects during the last few years. Another important person is the head of a private spatial planning company, serving as the municipalities' spatial planner. He advises the municipality in important questions as e.g. which policy instruments to use or which goals to pursue.

The central ideas of the local policy agenda are the preservation of the municipality with a village like identity and the surrounding green space. This is sought with a non-growth policy relating to population – although the development pressure has been quite high during the last years, what can be observed by the high building activities in the neighbouring municipalities. The last changes of the local building regulations have consolidated these goals, however making little densification processes in the town centre possible.

The most important policy instruments used are the *local zoning plan*¹⁴ (based on the *cantonal* and *regional directive plans*) that is the basis to issue regular building permits, and currently in one project a so called *area development plan* (an instrument that makes it possible to increase the intended floor area ratio when developing projects with a certain minimal area size).

Taking the non-growth goals and the used policy instruments into account, it seems that a broadly established regime-like cooperation between public and private actors is not taking place right now. Only for the one bigger building project it was necessary to establish new cooperation patterns, which however not lasted for long. Agenda-setting is done by the political executive unilaterally, with some advice from the municipalities' spatial planner. For the pursuit of the actual policy goals a further strategic and longstanding cooperation with private actors is not mentioned as necessary. There exist however informal connections between the public administration and private actors willing to invest, but the concern of these conversations are mostly small projects that can be handled within regular building regulations by the administration.

¹² An ideal-typical structure of the political and administrative system of smaller Swiss municipalities can be found in the Annex 8.1. To draw a more accurate picture of the local governance arrangements I also distinguish between the local government (the political executive of a municipality) and the local administration (the bureaucratic branch of a municipality). This is however not in line with American scholars mainly using the term *local government* for the political system *and* the administrative branch *together*.

¹³ In Switzerland, municipalities have big autonomy when it comes to the organisation of their political and administrative system. In most of the cantons (higher political tier as the *Länder* in Germany or the *states* in the US) municipalities are free to organise themselves concerning legislative and executive institutions (be they communal assemblies or parliaments and laymen councils or more professionally organised executives respectively). Some cantons however provide legal restrictions concerning e.g. the amount of seats of the executive branch, the work quota of the members of the executive or the type of legislative power (e.g. providing a parliament when having certain numbers of inhabitants).

¹⁴ Find an overview concerning the most important policy instruments in the Swiss planning law in the Annex 8.2.

When focusing on the question whether public or private actors dominate the local governance arrangement, the following can be observed: As mentioned before, agenda-setting is done by the public authorities quite unilaterally. Opponent private interests, e.g. willing to establish new and bigger housing projects within the surrounding green space, are on the one hand held down argumentatively in public discussions as at the municipal assembly (municipal legislative). The argumentation contains always the central agenda issue, namely the preservation of the village-like identity of HEDINGEN. On the other hand the local government is eager to procrastinate the enquiry for one big building project (expensive housing in agrarian zones) at the higher state level (the canton). In so doing and at the same time hoping that the canton will stick to its actual policy of not agreeing on the establishment/rezoning of new building zones anyway, the local government succeeds in pursuing its agenda against private interests. For other, smaller projects, there exists a quite tight supervision of the process leading to building permits by the local administration. The building department is thus able to control the implementation of the policy-agenda in early stages of the building process together with the house and land owners concerning details as e.g. the prohibition of flat roofs in the town centre.

Focussing on USTER, the second and biggest municipality under scrutiny, we observe the following important local actors: The representatives of the political executive (mostly the mayor and the municipal councils holding the building and the financial departments), highly ranked administrative staff members (as the head of the administration and the city planner), the presidents of the two important local commercial associations, the person accountable for fostering the local economy (employed by both the public authority and the commercial associations) and many private investors, architects and land owners.

The political agenda is formulated in a comprehensive public city strategy, focusing on an increase in population and economic growth. To achieve these goals a further densification of the already quite urban city centre and the redevelopment of some urban brownfields is sought. The village-like old centres of the former neighbouring towns – nowadays amalgamated with USTER – should thereby stay rural. A high housing quality enriched with green space and public parks is pursued to attract good taxpayers willing to live in an urban area, but not in the metropolitan areas' core city.

The local actors in USTER chose the whole range of possible policy instruments. Additionally to the ones used in HEDINGEN, different and more *directive plans* and *special zoning and urban design plans* are employed. The local government recently started a new *land use policy* (buying strategically important real estate objects and developing them according to the policy agenda or selling them to private investors, making them to sign a contract to develop according to the local policy agenda). Policy instruments not intentionally designed for spatial planning and urban design are also used (as e.g. *cantonal regulations for flood protection*, which has been used to finance the modification of the centrally located park area).

To pursue the proposed policy agenda, the local government and the administration officials need to cooperate quite a lot with private actors. This fact is firstly observable at the policy instruments chosen, which *de jure* make cooperation between public and private actors necessary. Special building regulations as *special zoning and urban design plans* come into effect (and result mostly in outcomes that all involved persons agree on) only after a discussion and decision process at which both parties participate. Secondly most of the planned projects are voluminous or affect more

than one parcel owned by different people with different development ideas. A cooperation bargained under a municipal umbrella is here often the only solution which makes a developing process possible at all. Moreover there is also cooperation that is not only project-oriented, but strategic and longstanding. The referred important actors communicate through formal, but also informal channels concerning the city's policy agenda (one local association even formulated an own strategy for the development of the city centre, coming to similar results as the political executive), the biggest development projects and ideas for future developments. The mayor e.g. organises so called *summit conferences* with the presidents of the local commercial associations to discuss actual political questions. The political executive and sometimes also the city planner are also frequently present at different social get-togethers (e.g. commercial receptions, sightseeing of local business firms), where important projects are tangibly discussed and advanced. Finally public and private resources are merged for pivotal development projects: Private investors develop and finance new buildings for which political actors advocate in political decision making processes. The administration is at the same time responsible for the side projects linking new construction sites with existing public space nearby (e.g. valorisation of road space). The governance arrangement of USTER thus can be defined clearly as an urban regime.

Of course it is not easy to assess the domination by different actors in a governance arrangement resembling an urban regime, because the emphasis on cooperation is a core aspect of it. In USTER it is however still possible to see that the local government is in general able to get through with its ideas. Within the most important building projects of the last few years the remarkable role of the city planner has to be mentioned. His immense knowledge of the natural, functional and architectonic structures of USTER (he has been on this position for almost 30 years) makes it possible for the municipal authorities to intervene in private projects with thoroughly formulated critic and assertiveness. Moreover he and his department have steered projects in favourable directions for the city, sometimes with the use of the already mentioned unconventional policy instruments as well. The city's strategy has been born ten years ago, also based on the city planners' knowledge. The municipal building department interferes also in smaller building projects. When a planned project violates the cities' strategy or does not suit to its surrounding they decline the building permit, based on the so called classification paragraph of the planning regulation. The only possible solution for the land owner is to prosecute a claim by legal action, which is not at all favourable for all parties. Usually, but not always, this harsh approach by the municipality leads to a new discussion and reassessment of the whole project.

4.2 ECONOMIC DECLINE: ST. MARGRETHEN AND ARBON

The eastern part of Switzerland has economically long lived from major industrial companies. Structural changes (outsourcing of production, sales slumps, etc.) have led to significant economic problems and to the abandoning of many such companies. In ST. MARGRETHEN (wood-processing, paint production and textile industry) and ARBON (mainly lorry and coach production), locally important companies had to give up their production about 20 years ago. What has followed was a vicious circle of rising tax level, emigration of good taxpayers and immigration of people seeking cheap flats, in short: a huge economic decline, resulting also in big urban brownfields still seen as "scars in the midst of the town centres". Moreover the eastern part of Switzerland has long not been part of a big and powerful metropolitan area, and is today still only partially. These facts have led to shrinking pressure, bringing difficult situations for the local actors as

whether and how to develop and finance new development projects or how to set up and communicate an adequate policy agenda.

Starting with the smaller municipality of ST. MARGRETHEN I observe the following actors as the most important in the local policy field of spatial planning and development: The political executive and here mainly the full-time mayor¹⁵ (responsible for the municipalities' strategic spatial development), the head and the secretary of the municipalities' building department, the private company being in charge of the municipal spatial planning and a few important investors (mainly investing in the big development project on the biggest urban brownfield).

The policy agenda focuses mainly on the redevelopment of the big urban brownfield next to the railway station and on other small former industrial areas with premium housing project and new spaces for business and retail companies. One of the main goals is the attraction of good taxpayers to influence the economic disadvantages of the high local tax level positively. Further the municipality aims for the densification of its town centre, tied to the valorisation of public streets and better shopping facilities.

For pursuing these goals different policy instruments are chosen by the municipalities' authorities and the private investors. The basis is the *communal zoning plan* and the *spatial planning regulations*. For bigger (and the one huge) project *special development plans* are used. The political executive further makes often use of *land use policies*, i.e. buying strategically important real estate objects to develop them unilaterally or to use them for bargaining processes with private actors willing to invest neighbouring estates. The local government finally threatened to use an instrument called *planning zone* to stop the current planning process for five years, using the time for a re-evaluation of all development possibilities for a specific area.

Looking closer at the policy agenda and the choice of instruments, it seems clear that some deeper cooperation between public and private actors have had to be established. Concerning the biggest project, the redevelopment of the huge urban brownfield, there exist a close cooperation (i.e. regular meetings on all major topics e.g. concerning future usage of the buildings, the building permit, the design of the further process etc.) between the investor and the municipality, represented mainly by the mayor and the head of the building department. This cooperation between different private actors and the local government is however not reaching beyond this single project. One reason could be that the main investor is not a local and thus not that much tied to local day to day political processes. The political agenda is designed and formulated by the executive government in cooperation with the private spatial planner in charge (who is not a local), and is not based on the ideas or a close cooperation with the most important private investors. Public interests expressed by citizens at public events or over other informal communication channels are included step by step into the agenda goals though. These concerns however are not always connected to specific questions of spatial development – there exists no overarching policy agenda supported by the political actors and the financially important private investors. To sum up, it is not possible to find an urban regime with a longstanding cooperation concerning the whole policy field, its agenda and forms of cooperation. Cooperation and the sharing of resources is rather project based, and not strategic.

Coming to the question whether private actors dominate the local governance arrangement of ST. MARGRETHEN I observe the following: Although the municipality is

¹⁵ In the two cantons to which the here described municipalities under development pressure belong, St. Gallen and Thurgau, mayors are often appointed full-time (in contrary to the canton of Zurich, where the before mentioned municipalities belong to), although there exist no binding cantonal legal principle.

highly dependent on one investor, financing the redevelopment of the big urban brownfield, the local government is eager to bring its own ideas in. They do it for example in the project meetings with the private actors. Compared to these rather soft instruments preferred by the omnipresent mayor the threat of installing a *planning zone* to stop further planning a few years ago has been quite contrasting. The reason for using this instrument was that the former investors did not agree on the municipalities' idea of developing the urban brownfield. It eventually led to a re-evaluation of the planning possibilities and to the actually pursued project. Public actors also take part in architectural competitions as members of the jury, especially in those projects where the public is land owner as well. Here the potential of strategic buying of real estate objects is observable. For smaller building projects as single family homes there exist "consultation-hours" by the building department, which are frequently used by the land owners and make compromises possible, but is not eliminating the threat of private land owners developing projects not favoured by the municipality within the normal building regulations. The local governance arrangement is however in general not dominated by private actors.

What about the last municipality in the presented sample, ARBON? Here the most important actors in the communal spatial planning and development processes are the two relevant members of the political executive (the mayor and the municipal council for the building department), the possessor of the administrative position for city development and communication and further administrative staff members (the head of the building department and the municipalities spatial planner). Some private actors are also mentioned as being important. Here the one project developer company responsible for the huge and centrally located urban brownfield is crucial. Further a broad network of entrepreneurs, architects and local investors as well as local politicians (many of them being part of the local liberal's party) is mentioned.

The local political agenda concentrates on a modification of the whole city, away from the industrially based working city to an entrepreneurial business city. Thereby the old town is sought to increasingly be a place for living, what is also the goal for the former industrial parts – especially the centrally located huge urban brownfield – of the city. An additional increase of employment numbers is another important policy aim. One of the major projects of the last years has been a new cantonal access road bringing traffic quicker to the city centre and the new development sites and away from smaller side streets and the old town.

The choice of policy instruments to pursue the policy agenda is quite similar to the one in USTER, i.e. many different instruments are used: the *local zoning plan*, various *directive* and *special usage plans*. ARBONS local government does not use instruments not designed for spatial planning and except in one case it normally also does not buy real estate objects. The local communication strategy with which the inhabitants are informed is however more prominent and more comprehensive than in the other municipalities under scrutiny, what relates also to the special administrative position for city development and communication, newly established by the former mayor about seven years ago.

In following the ambitious policy goals the local government and the administration are dependent on private financial potential. The private however need the political support to get through the political (i.e. the parliament) and administrative process with their projects. There is thus a broad cooperation between public and private actors observable, which takes part on different levels of formality, but also in quite different qualitative manners. The aim of the public authorities is to assure the

public goals, i.e. valorisation of public space, in privately financed project, while creating a positive climate for investments of other private companies. Many of these cooperations are established only on a project basis. However there are also strategic meetings, informal or formal, between important actors. As in USTER, ARBONS mayor has established *summit conferences*, at which different topics concerning the municipality's future can be discussed informally and without any written protocol. These meetings are used widely by local entrepreneurs, architects and also by administrative staff members. The municipality's advertisement slogan "city of broad horizons" has been formulated by the political executive, but is widely accepted and supported by various private actors, who also see their interests represented by it. The former mayor (in office from 2006 to 2012) has been very important for the establishment of such good cooperation schemes. His many contacts to local entrepreneurs, but also to cantonal and local politicians have paved the way to many (also informally settled) deals concerning the spatial development of the city. The governance arrangement of ARBON thus resembles an urban regime.

Coming to the dominating actors, a more complicated picture has to be drawn. Concerning the local policy agenda the local government clearly dominates the local governance. In concrete building projects this is however not always that easy. Especially in the development project of the centrally located urban brownfield, a certain dependency of the public actors is observable. Here private actors thus possess quite high leeway to get their development ideas through. During the office period of the former mayor, he and the person responsible for city development and communication could balance these processes to their favour. But because the *special usage plan* was implemented earlier, their range of influence was quite small. Since the demission of the former mayor and his staff member the pendulum swung back with not yet predictable results for the originally planned public spaces. In smaller project the local government could intervene successfully, also against persons belonging to the local building elite. One pivotal project was declined because of "architectural deficits". It is thus possible to observe a certain domination by private actors, especially in the one crucial project. When it comes to the local policy agenda and smaller development projects, the local government is able to play an important role though.

5 WHY DO GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS DIFFER?

5.1 A SHORT ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS VS. THE PROPOSED MODEL

As displayed in Table 4 the theoretically proposed model can only be empirically shown partially. In short, four quite different local governance arrangements can be observed. The local governance arrangements in the two municipalities under development pressure resemble the theoretically proposed shapes: they are in both municipalities dominated by the local government and are either urban regime like (in the big USTER) or not based on longstanding strategic cooperation between private and public actors (in the small HEDINGEN).

For the municipalities facing economic decline the picture is however not that clear: Even though there are either no longstanding coalition pattern observable in the smaller ST. MARGRETHEN, compared to urban regime like structures in the bigger ARBON, the domination by private actors is not visible as theoretically proposed. In ST. MARGRETHEN there is a dominating local government, where in ARBON it can only dominate the smaller building projects according to its agenda aims. Concerning the one

important redevelopment of a former industrial area, there is a private company, against that's interests only the former mayor and his specialist for development and communication could intervene successfully according to their goals.

Table 4: Presentation of the proposed model for the shape of local governance arrangements contrasted with empirical results in four municipalities.

		Size of a municipality				
		small		big		
		Forms of collaboration between the local government and private actors				
Economic situation of a municipality	Development Pressure	Domination of the local governance by the local government	domination by the local government	✓	domination by the local government	✓
			no coalitions	✓	coalition/regime	✓
			HEDINGEN		USTER	
	Shrinking Pressure		domination by private actors	X	domination by private actors	(v)
			no coalitions	✓	coalition/regime	✓
			ST. MARGRETHEN		ARBON	

Let us then look closer at the relations between economic situations, the size of municipalities and local governance arrangements, taking different reasons and statements by the interviewees into account.

5.2 EXTERNAL PRESSURE AND SIZE MATTERS, BUT SOMEHOW DIFFERENTLY AND MORE INTERLINKED THAN THEORETICALLY PROPOSED

The economic situation of a municipality should – as I proposed theoretically in *thesis 1* – influence the local governance arrangement of a suburban municipality. Why and how thus can an economically positive or negative situation foster the domination of the local governance arrangement by actors of the local government or by private stakeholders empirically?

The two case studies show *firstly* that the definition of a coherent local policy agenda is easier when facing economic growth. The case studies show that the tax competition between the municipalities' makes it necessary to define goals that pursue the attraction of good tax payers, what of course is also true for municipalities facing economic decline. It is however easier for economically developing municipalities in the metropolitan area of ZURICH to fill special niches, because there are many good taxpayers with quite divers ideas of an ideal place to live outside the core city. USTER and HEDINGEN – though their agendas are different, a city for urban commuters vs. a village-like town surrounded by green space – are able to set up goals that attract many people, what gives the local government a legitimization for their strategies and their domination of the political processes leading to new building projects. ST. MARGRETHEN and ARBON are

seeking for better taxpayers in general, but do not have the freedom to concentrate on one special segment of future inhabitants. Shortly, the high demand for various different living ideals in economically developing regions makes the interventions of local governments easier. One has to consider however, that the two municipalities facing economic growth can define more precise agenda goals also because they vary so much in their size (USTER is the third biggest municipality in the metropolitan area of ZURICH, HEDINGEN one of the smallest), what would reflect a bias according to the case selection strategy. Municipalities with inhabitant numbers between USTER and HEDINGEN are in more difficult situations, because the niches of being big or small is lacking (see Devecchi forthcoming). A clear policy agenda makes it also possible to choose and implement adequate policy instruments for further spatial development processes because ideas concerning these processes already exist. Examples are the choice of a *local directive plan* to smoothly develop a new housing area analogical to the city strategy in USTER or the already mentioned *refused intervention* for a new housing zone of HEDINGENS municipal council at the cantonal level. Last but not least the awareness of not having development ideas helps also, as e.g. HEDINGEN decided not to implement a *planning zone*, because it lacked precise ideas how to use it.

Secondly an economically positive surrounding is making the local governments less dependent on *single* but important building projects and the private investors being in charge of them. ST. MARGRETHEN and ARBON have made the redevelopment of their centrally located urban brownfields to their primary agenda goals. Here especially the local government of the latter struggles in achieving the targeted goals, because the only company investing is not keen to pursue all of them (e.g. housing units with large public spaces vs. expensive housing units with semi-private spaces). In USTER however there are not only more projects, but also more investors. The possibility to develop several bigger projects simultaneously has on the one hand lowered the pressure on the local government and the administration to influence each single project as much as possible according to their strategy goals; i.e. different goals have been pursued with different projects. This situation then fostered on the other hand a surrounding of positive feedback within the circle of private investors about the not too tight position of the local government, what led to mutual trust between the private and the public actors – a necessary condition to establish an urban regime.

Thirdly the two cases in the eastern part of Switzerland show however that economic decline not always has to lead to a domination of the local governance arrangement by private actors. The responses to this situation of the actual mayor in ST. MARGRETHEN and the former mayor in ARBON let assume contradicting behaviours in relation to the theoretically proposed model. Instead of being under pressure by private interests they built up their administrations (with a new position for development and communication in ARBON), took over the steering wheels concerning the most important projects, became the nodal points of the local governance networks and rewrote the existing policy goals in coherent communication messages and in revised *local directive plans* (in both municipalities). Such behaviour is possible because of two reasons: On the one hand the strong position of the mayors reflects their full-time employment. On the other hand personal skills play an important role: Both mayors are described as “doers”, as extraordinary well connected to local politicians, to private investors and to cantonal personnel. Further both of them have a broad technical knowledge and interpret their role as mayors somehow similar: as the first contact person of the local government concerning all possible problems posed by inhabitants and other private stakeholders. Such a strong interpretation of the role as a mayor is not observable in USTER and HEDINGEN, but perhaps also not necessary because of the better economic situation and

the thus easier way to pursue the policy goals. One has to consider however that the institutional possibility of a strong mayor not always has to lead to such strong interpretations of the mayors' function in reality. The bargaining advantage of the local government in ARBON came for example to a halt after the demission of the mentioned mayor. Today the pursuit of the former public goals is more uncertain than ever before.

The size of a municipality matters as theoretically proposed in *thesis 2* according to the short summary of the four case studies. Local governance arrangements resembling urban regimes can be found in the two bigger municipalities. Looser, less longstanding forms of cooperation in the smaller. Looking closer at the results and comparing these findings, the following points seem to be remarkable.

As already mentioned before, it seems that the professionalization of the political executive *firstly* influences the cooperation schemes of the municipalities under scrutiny quite a lot. Full-time mayors are not only able to take over responsibility in times of economic crisis or for particular important projects; they can also influence the broader way of cooperation established in their municipalities. The mayors of USTER and ARBON are not only present in the most important building projects, but organise arenas for discussions on broad topics and various projects concerning their municipalities' future. They include private stakeholders, administrative heads of departments and their colleagues of the municipal councils intentionally to build up strategic alliances and networks, which then advocate for their goals. After a positive political decision these persons are also held accountable when it comes to the implementation, i.e. the development and financing of new building projects, small side-projects and further ideas for development.

Although there is a full-time mayor in ST. MARGRETHEN as well, he is not able to establish regime-like forms of cooperation. This fact can be connected to the *second point* to be discussed here: the professionalization of the local administration. The mayor of ST. MARGRETHEN seems to be too absorbed by the one big redevelopment project, and is thus not able to establish a coalition for an even broader range of policy agenda goals. USTER and ARBON however do not only possess full-time mayors, but also more administrative positions not only concerned with operational question. USTER'S city planner and ARBON'S specialist on development and communication are used as strategic assets by their mayors: They can provide a backup of technical, strategic and architectural knowledge – not only focused on one single project – that can usefully be brought into discussions by the municipalities' council or the mayor when bargaining *various* projects with private investors. Whereby the continuity of the public strategy could have been ensured in USTER with the city planner, there is not that much hope for continuity in ARBON. This is because of the demission not only of the former mayor, but also of the person responsible for development and communication. Establishing a regime-like cooperation network is thus only one side of the coin – it must sustain political and administrative changes, what seems to be harder than imagined.

Finally I shortly want to focus on the choice of policy instruments, which mostly do not relate to the economic surrounding but to the size of a municipality. The stakeholders of the two smaller municipalities and here especially the ones in HEDINGEN choose instruments that are connected to less administrative resources than bigger municipalities. Further they choose a smaller set of instruments. They thereby generate a more formal cooperation with private actors; the regular process to a building permit is adequate for their mostly smaller building projects (except the big redevelopment project in ST. MARGRETHEN). In USTER and ARBON the choice of instruments results in a broader variety of instruments, which further result in the need for bargaining about the goals of the projects between public and private actors (e.g. *architectural competitions*,

PPP's or instruments based on special building regulations as *special development plans*). The need for a differing choice of policy instruments can be found also in the more complex development of bigger municipalities, where bigger and higher buildings are sought to develop or where the existing ideas for development are discussed more widely.

In sum, both proposed explaining factors seem to influence the local governance arrangements. Their explanatory power is thus much higher when they are not taken into account as independent factors. The economic situation is sometimes responsible for certain conditions also shaped by the size of the municipality and vice versa. As we have seen, the question whether public or private actors dominate a regime-like governance arrangement is for example difficult to answer, because regimes are always a type of cooperation based on mutual trust and resources, whereby too much domination of one side could jeopardise such a cooperation.

Besides these two factors influencing the shape of local governance arrangements, other possible explanatory factors should be taken into account after considering these case studies. First and foremost the importance of the interpretation of the different roles by different actors must be taken into account. We have seen that similar positions are not always filled with people acting similar. These different interpretation of positions can have crucial influence on local governance arrangements, be it their policy agendas or their choice of policy instruments.

6 CONCLUSION: THE VEIL IS CLEARING, BUT NOT TOTALLY

The aim of this paper was to investigate two related research questions concerning local governance arrangements and thus tying it to Dahl's question of 'who governs?'. Firstly I wanted to know whether different kinds of governance arrangements exist in *suburban* municipalities and which factors can be made responsible for the establishment of these types. Secondly I asked how public and private stakeholders can influence the decision-making and implementation processes of local development policies within these arrangements. To answer these two questions, two different arguments from the body of the urban governance literature have been taken into account, which until yet focused mostly on big cities or metropolitan areas as a whole. These two arguments have been combined to a model of local governance arrangements. Firstly I proposed the thesis that the economic situation of a municipality shapes the domination in a local governance arrangement, either by public or private stakeholders. Secondly I derived the thesis that the size of a municipality, i.e. the professionalization of the municipal administration and executive shape the local governance arrangement in relation to the form of cooperation between the public and the private actors. My results base on a qualitative analysis of four suburban municipalities in Switzerland.

To sum up I found four quite different local governance arrangements, which are in accordance with some of the theoretical propositions: Local governance arrangements in bigger municipalities tend to resemble the form of urban regimes; i.e. longstanding coalitions between public and private actors which set up a commonly formulated policy-agenda and establish a common use of normally disperse resources (as private financial capital and institutional decision making power). In small municipalities there can be observed looser forms of cooperation between public and private stakeholders, in which no common agenda is established. The picture of the impact of different economic surrounding on the local governance arrangement is however less clear. In developing regions a domination of the political processes by the

political actors is observable, in line with the theoretically proposed argumentation. In shrinking municipalities however there is no full domination by private actors. Although public officials can get through with their ideas in smaller projects often, there is however a certain dependency on them in the big pivotal projects, concerning the redevelopment of the centrally located urban brownfields. Here private stakeholders are able to gain advantages to implement their own agendas (e.g. expensive housing units vs. public spaces).

Although the proposed theoretical arguments have made it possible to look behind local governance arrangements in suburban municipalities quite comprehensively, they do not unveil all relevant processes concerning the question of who governs and how. One reason is that the two mentioned factors (size of a municipality and its economic surrounding) theoretically influencing the shape of local governance arrangement and also their proposed impacts are not always easy distinguishable.

The case studies however also reveal one other promising factor to study further: the perception of the roles of the involved (public) actors and the real consequences resulting from these interpretations. Here especially the strongly acting mayors in the two shrinking municipalities compared to the mayors facing economic development give examples of different (personal) understandings of the local state: the former see the state and its role not only as *an intervening state* as the latter do, but also as an *acting state* (e.g. by actively and strategically buying land and developing it according to their own ideas) (see also Braun and Giraud 2009). Actors in different municipalities thus do not only have similar or different institutional or financial power, they also show similar or different behaviour when it comes to their agency.

7 REFERENCES

- ARE, BUNDESAMT FÜR RAUMENTWICKLUNG (2009): *Monitoring urbaner Raum Schweiz – Analysen zu Städten und Agglomerationen*. Bern: BBL.
- BERNT, MATTHIAS (2009): "Partnerships for Demolition: The Governance of Urban Renewal in East Germany's Shrinking Cities", in: *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33 (3): 754-769.
- BRAUN, DIETMAR, and GIRAUD, OLIVIER (2009): "Politikinstrumente im Kontext von Staat, Markt und Governance", in: *Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse 2.0*, eds. KLAUS SCHUBERT and BANDELOW, NILS C. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. 159-190.
- BRENNER, NEIL (1999): "Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Rescaling of Urban Governance in the European Union", in: *Urban Studies* 36 (3): 431-451.
- BRENNER, NEIL (2000): "The Urban Question: Reflections on Henri Lefebvre, Urban Theory and the Politics of scale", in: *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24 (2): 361-378.
- BRENNER, NEIL (2004): *New State Spaces. Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BRENNER, NEIL, and THEODORE, NIK (2004): *Spaces of Neoliberalism - Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe*. Malden/Oxford/Melbourne/Berlin: Blackwell.
- CASTELLS, MANUEL (1972): *La Question Urbaine*. Paris: Maspero.
- CATTACIN, SANDRO (1994): *Stadtentwicklung zwischen Demokratie und Komplexität*. Wien: Campus.

- DAHL, ROBERT A. (1961): *Who Governs?*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- DAHL, ROBERT A., and TUFTE, EDWARD R. (1973): *Size and Democracy*. Stanford/London: Stanford University Press/Oxford University Press.
- DAVIES, JONATHAN S. (2002): "Urban Regime Theory: A Normative-Empirical Critique", in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 24 (1): 1-17.
- DAVIES, JONATHAN S. (2003): "Partnerships versus Regimes: Why Regime Theory Cannot Explain Urban Coalitions in the UK", in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 25 (3): 253-270.
- DEVECCHI, LINEO U. (2012): "Von politischen Grabenkämpfen zur kooperativen Planung: Der Paradigmenwechsel in der Stadtentwicklungspolitik hin zu einem urbanen Regime in Zürich", in: *disP - The Planning Review* 48 (4): 45-55.
- DEVECCHI, LINEO U. (forthcoming): "Entwicklungsideen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Stadt und Dorf: Politische Agendaziele in Schweizer Umlandgemeinden", in: *Diskursmuster – Discourse Patterns*, eds. INGO H. WARNKE and BUSSE, BEATRIX. Oldenburg: Akademie Verlag.
- DIGAETANO, ALAN, and LAWLESS, PAUL (1999): "Urban Governance and Industrial Decline: Governing Structures and Policy Agendas in Birmingham and Sheffield, England, and Detroit, Michigan, 1980-1997", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 34 (4): 546-577.
- DIGAETANO, ALAN, and STROM, ELIZABETH (2003): "Comparative Urban Governance: An Integrated Approach", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 38 (3): 356-395.
- DOWDING, KEITH, DUNLEAVY, PATRICK, KING, DESMOND, MARGETTS, HELEN, and RYDIN, YVONNE (1999): "Regime Politics in London Local Government", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 34 (4): 515-545.
- EBERLE, ORLANDO (2003): *Konflikte, Allianzen und territoriale Kompromisse in der Stadtentwicklung*. Bern: Philosophisch-naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Bern, unveröffentlichte Diplomarbeit.
- ELKIN, STEPHEN L. (1987): *City and Regime in the American Republic*. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
- FAINSTEIN, SUSAN S., and FAINSTEIN, NORMAN I. (1983): "Regime strategies, communal resistance and economic forces", in: *Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Development*, eds. SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN/FAINSTEIN, NORMAN I./HILL, ROBERT C./JUDD, DAVID R. and SMITH, MICHAEL P. London: Longman.
- FERMAN, BARBARA (1996): *Challenging the Growth Machine: Neighbourhood Politics in Chicago and Pittsburgh*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- FLYVBJERG, BENT (2006): "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research", in: *Qualitative Inquiry* 12 (2): 219-245.
- FREY, BRUNO S., and EICHENBERGER, REINER (2001): "Metropolitan Governance for the Future: Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ)", in: *Swiss Political Science Review* 7 (3): 124-130.
- GERRING, JOHN (2007): *Case Study Research - Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GIBBS, GRAHAM (2007): "Thematic Coding and Categorizing", in: *Analyzing Qualitative Data*, ed. GRAHAM GIBBS. Los Angeles: Sage. 73-89.
- HAMILTON, DAVID K. (2002): "Regimes and Regional Governance: The Case of Chicago", in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 24 (4): 403-423.
- HITZ, HANSRUEDI, KEIL, ROGER, LEHRER, UTE, RONNEBERGER, KLAUS, SCHMID, CHRISTIAN, and WOLFF, RICHARD (1995): *Capitales Fatales – Urbanisierung und Politik in den Finanzmetropolen Frankfurt und Zürich*. Zürich: Rotpunkt Verlag.
- HUNTER, FLOYD (1953): *Community Power Structure - A Study of Decision Makers*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

- IMBROSCIO, DAVID L. (1998): "Reformulating Urban Regime Theory: The Division of Labor Between State and Market Reconsidered", in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20 (3): 233-248.
- IMBROSCIO, DAVID L. (2003): "Overcoming the Neglect of Economics in Urban Regime Theory", in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 25 (3): 271-284.
- JOHN, PETER, and COLE, ALISTAIR (1998): "Urban Regimes and Local Governance in Britain and France", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 33 (3): 382-404.
- KANTOR, PAUL, SAVITCH, HANK. V., and HADDOCK, SERENA VICARI (1997): "The Political Economy of Urban Regimes - A Comparative Perspective", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 32 (3): 348-377.
- KEATING, MICHAEL (1993): "The Politics of Economic Development", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 28 (3): 373-396.
- KLEGER, HEINZ (1996): *Metropolitane Transformation durch urbane Regime. Berlin-Brandenburg auf dem Weg zu regionaler Handlungsfähigkeit*. Amsterdam: Verlag Fakultas.
- KNOX, PAUL L., and TAYLOR, PETER J. (1993): *World Cities in a World-System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- KOCH, PHILIPPE (2011): *Governancewandel und Legitimität in Schweizer Agglomerationen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- KÜBLER, DANIEL (2003): "'Metropolitan Governance' oder: Die unendliche Geschichte der Institutionenbildung in Stadtregionen", in: *Information zu Raumentwicklung* 8/9: 535-541.
- KÜBLER, DANIEL (2006): "Agglomerationen", in: *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik*, eds. ULRICH KLÖTI/KNOEPFEL, HANSPETER/KRIESI, HANSPETER/PAPADOPOULOS, YANNIS and SCIARINI, PASCAL. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 259-286.
- KÜBLER, DANIEL, and SCHEUSS, URS (2005): "Metropolitanization and Political Change in Switzerland", in: *Metropolitanization and Political Change*, eds. VINCENT HOFFMANN-MARTINOT and SELLERS, JEFFEREY M. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- KÜBLER, DANIEL, and SCHWAB, BRIGITTE (2007): "New Regionalism in Five Swiss Metropolitan Areas: An Assessment of Inclusiveness, Deliberation and Democratic Accountability", in: *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (4): 473-502.
- KÜHNE, ARMIN (1997): *Regimewandel durch Grossprojekte - Auf der Suche nach lokaler Handlungsfähigkeit in Zürich und Wien*. Amsterdam: Verlag Fakultas.
- KVALE, STEINAR (2007): *Doing Interviews*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli: Sage Publications.
- KVALE, STEINAR, and BRINKMANN, SVEND (2009): *InterViews - Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*. 2. ed. Thousand Oaks, New Dehli, London, Singapore: Sage Publications.
- LADNER, ANDREAS (1994): "Lokale Politik und der Einfluss lokalpolitischer Akteure", in: *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 20 (2): 303-328.
- LASCOUMES, PIERRE, and LE GALÈS, PATRICK (2007): "Introduction: Understanding Public Policy Through Its Instruments—From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation", in: *Governance* 20 (1): 1-21.
- LEACH, ROBERT, and PERCY-SMITH, JANIE (2001): *Local Governance in Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- LEFEBVRE, HENRI (1974 [1991]): *The Production of Space*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.


- LEFÈVRE, CHRISTIAN (1998): "Metropolitan Government and Governance in Western Countries: a Critical Review", in: *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 22 (1): 9-25.
- LOGAN, JOHN R., and MOLOTCH, HARVEY L (1987): *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- MACLEOD, GORDON, and GOODWIN, MARK (1999): "Space, Scale and State Strategy: Rethinking Urban and Regional Governance", in: *Progress in Human Geography* 23 (4): 503-527.
- MILLS, C. WRIGHT (1956 [2000]): *The Power Elite - New Edition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- MOSSBERGER, KAREN, and STOKER, GERRY (2001): "The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 36 (6): 810-835.
- MUGGLI, RUDOLF (2011): *NFP 65 Urbane Brüche/lokale Interventionen: Werkzeugkasten für die öffentliche Hand zur Erreichung von Qualitätszielen (Entwurf)*. Bern: AD!VOCATE.
- NEWTON, KEN (1982): "Is Small Really so Beautiful? Is Big Really so Ugly? Size, Effectiveness, and Democracy in Local Government", in: *Political Studies* 30 (2): 190-206.
- NORRIS, DONALD F. (2001): "Whither Metropolitan Governance?", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 36 (4): 532-550.
- OLIVER, J. ERIC (2000): "City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America", in: *American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 361-373.
- OLIVER, J. ERIC (2001): *Democracy in Suburbia*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- OLIVER, J. ERIC (2012): *Local Elections and the Politics of Small-Scale Democracy*. Princeton/ Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- ORR, MARION E., and STOKER, GERRY (1994): "Urban Regimes and Leadership in Detroit", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 30 (1): 48-73.
- OSTROM, VINCENT, and OSTROM, ELINOR (1971): "Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration", in: *Public Administration Review* 31 (2): 203-216.
- OSTROM, VINCENT, TIEBOUT, CHARLES M., and WARREN, ROBERT (1961): "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry", in: *The American Political Science Review* 55 (4): 831-842.
- PIERRE, JON (1998): "Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Governance: Introduction", in: *Partnerships in Urban Governance: European and American Experience*, ed. JON PIERRE. London: Macmillan. 11-33.
- PIERRE, JON (1999): "Models of Urban Governance", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 34 (3): 372-396.
- PIERRE, JON (2005): "Comparative Urban Governance - Uncovering Complex Causalities", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 40 (4): 446-462.
- PIERRE, JON, and PETERS, B. GUY (2000): *Governance, Politics and the State*. London: Macmillan Press.
- PLÜSS, LARISSA, and KÜBLER, DANIEL (2010): "Raumpolitik im Agglo-Mosaik: Politische und institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen in der S5-Stadt", in: *S5-Stadt. Agglomeration im Zentrum. Forschungsberichte*, ed. DEPARTEMENT ARCHITEKTUR ETH WOHNFORUM - ETH CASE. Baden: hier + jetzt Verlag. 71-88.
- ROSE, LAWRENCE E. (2002): "Municipal Size and Local Nonelectoral Participation: Findings from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway", in: *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 20 (6): 829-851.

- RÜEGG, ERWIN (1996): *Urbanität und Stadtentwicklung: politische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bologna, Frankfurt/Main und Zürich*. Amsterdam: Verlag Fakultas.
- SASSEN, SASKIA (2001): *The Global City - New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- SAVITCH, HANK V., and VOGEL, RONALD K. (2009): "Regionalism and Urban Politics.", in: *Theories of Urban Politics*, eds. JONATHAN DAVIES and IMBROSCIO, DAVID. London: Sage Publications. 106-124.
- SCHALTEGGER, CHRISTOPH A., SOMOGYI, FRANK, and STURM, JAN-EGBERT (2011): "Tax Competition and Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area", in: *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 (3): 455-470.
- SCHMID, CHRISTIAN (2006): "Global City Zurich: Paradigms of Urban Development", in: *The Global Cities Reader*, eds. NEIL BRENNER and KEIL, ROGER. London/New York. 159-169.
- SCHMIDHEINY, KURT (2006): "Income Segregation and Local Progressive Taxation: Empirical Evidence from Switzerland", in: *Journal of Public Economics* 90 (3): 429-458.
- SELLERS, JEFFREY M. (2002a): *Governing From Below - Urban Regions and the Global Economy*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- SELLERS, JEFFREY M. (2002b): "The nation-state and urban governance - Toward multilevel analysis", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 37 (5): 611-641.
- SELLERS, JEFFREY M. (2005): "Re-placing the nation - An agenda for comparative urban politics", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 40 (4): 419-445.
- SIEVERTS, THOMAS (1997): *Zwischenstadt, zwischen Ort und Welt, Raum und Zeit, Stadt und Land*. Braunschweig: Vieweg.
- STOKER, GERRY (1998): "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions", in: *International Social Science Journal* 50 (155): 17-28.
- STOKER, GERRY, and MOSSBERGER, KAREN (1994): "Urban Regime Theory in Comparative Perspective", in: *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 12 (2): 195-212.
- STONE, CLARENCE N. (1989): *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- STONE, CLARENCE N. (1993): "Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach", in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 15 (1): 1-28.
- STONE, CLARENCE N. (2005): "Looking Back to Look Forward: Reflections on Urban Regime Analysis", in: *Urban Affairs Review* 40 (3): 309-341.
- SWANIEWICZ, PAWEL (HRSG.) (2002): *Consolidation or fragmentation? The Size of Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- TIEBOUT, CHARLES M. (1956): "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures", in: *The Journal of Political Economy* 64 (5): 416-424.
- VAN DER HEIDEN, NICO (2010): *Urban Foreign Policy and Domestic Dilemmas – Insights from Swiss and EU City-regions*. Essex: ECPR Press.

8 ANNEX

8.1 IDEAL-TYPICAL STRUCTURE OF A SUBURBAN SWISS MUNICIPALITY

Table 5: The political structure of an ideal-typical Swiss suburban municipality, notice that the legislative institutions can vary, as well as the functions of the different departments.



8.2 SWISS (MUNICIPAL) SPATIAL PLANNING INSTRUMENTS: AN OVERVIEW

Table 6: The "toolkit" of Swiss municipalities concerning spatial development (based on Muggli 2011: , adapted by L.D.)

Classic Spatial Planning			Control of land use, land use policy	Incentive systems	
strategic background	strategic, binding for administration	operative, binding for land owners	buying land (strategically) by public authorities, selling it with purpose to private or developing own projects	contractions, PPP	boni systems
strategies, concepts	directive plan	<div>zoning plan</div> <div>building regulation</div> <div>standard/special building regulations (see next table)</div>			

Table 7: Standard vs. special building regulations and their instruments

	Conditions to use	Process to building permit	Policy Instruments
Standard building regulations	projects based strictly on zoning plan	→normal process to building permit (via municipal administration)	Zoning plan, municipal building regulations, area development plan
Special building regulations	projects higher, bigger, ... than zoning plan allows for	→special process to building permit (mostly also via political executive and/or , sometimes even via political legislative)	special development plan